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Abstract
We consider the problem of protecting and manipulating elections by recounting and changing bal-
lots, respectively. Our setting involves a plurality-based election held across multiple districts, and the
problem formulations are based on the model proposed recently by [Elkind et al, IJCAI 2019]. It turns
out that both of the manipulation and protection problems are NP-complete even in fairly simple set-
tings. We study these problems from a parameterized perspective with the goal of establishing a more
detailed complexity landscape. The parameters we consider include the number of voters, and the
budgets of the attacker and the defender. While we observe fixed-parameter tractability when para-
meterizing by number of voters, our main contribution is a demonstration of parameterized hardness
when working with the budgets of the attacker and the defender.
Keywords and phrases Elections W-hardness Parameterized Complexity
1 Introduction
Electoral fraud and errors in consolidation of large-scale voting data are fundamental issues
in democratic societies. To counteract issues with malicious manipulations and accidental
errors in the counting of votes, most electoral systems allow for strategic recounting of bal-
lots to verify the election outcome. Recounting is generally an expensive and high-stakes
process, and it would be desirable to formalize the problem so as to capture the relevant
trade-offs and possibly pursue an algorithmic approach to finding an optimal recounting
strategy. Such a framework was recently proposed by Elkind et al. [5], where the authors
considered the problems of protecting and manipulating elections by recounting and chan-
ging ballots, respectively. These problems are modeled as a Stackelberg game involving an
attacker and a defender. Both players work with limited budgets (say BA and BD), and the
question is if the players can develop optimal strategies for their desired outcomes.
In this model, the election is spread out across multiple districts, with the voter preferences
aggregated according to the plurality voting rule in one of two different ways, which we will
explain explicitly in a moment. The manipulation problem is the following. The attacker has
to optimize, typically with the goal of turning the election in favor of a particular candidate
that he may have in mind, an attack strategy that involves manipulating the votes in at most
BA districts while ensuring that the impact of the attack persists even if the defender restores
at most BD of these districts to their original state. In the recounting problem, the defender
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is given complete information about the original and manipulated voting profiles and she
can restore the state of at most BD districts with the goal of making the “true winner” win
the repaired election.
Known Results.
The results obtained in [5] already demonstrate the hardness of the attacker’s and defender’s
problems for two natural ways of aggregating the votes: (1) Plurality over Voters (PV), where
districts are only used for the purpose of collecting the ballots and the winner is selected
among the candidates that receive the largest number of votes in total, and (2) Plurality
over Districts (PD), where each district selects a preferred candidate using the Plurality rule,
and the overall winner is chosen among the candidates supported by the largest number of
districts, or the set of districts with largest total weight if the districts have weights associated
with them. We briefly recall the main highlights from [5], since this provides the context
for our contributions. It turns out that the recounting problem is NP-complete for both
implementations of the plurality rule, even when there are only three candidates (this result
assumes a succinct representation of the votes) or even when the votes are specified in unary.
The problem is tractable when PD is employed over unweighted districts. On the other hand,
the manipulation problem is NP-hard for PD even with unweighted districts, and in fact, ΣP2 -
complete for PD with succinct input even when there are only three candidates. Further, it is
NP-hard for PV, again even when there are only three candidates (in the setting of succinct
input) or even when the votes are specified in unary.
Our Contributions.
Our main contribution is to establish the parameterized intractability of both the recounting
and manipulation problems under both implementations of the plurality voting rule when
parameterized by the budget of the players. Our contributions directly address a direction
suggested by [5]. In particular, we obtain the following results:
◮ Theorem 1. The PV-REC and PD-REC problems are W[2]-hard and W[1]-hard, respectively,
when parameterized by the budget of the defender, and are FPT when parameterized by the
number of districts.
◮ Theorem 2. The PV-MAN and PD-MAN problems are W[1]-hard when parameterized by the
budget of the attacker (even when the defender budget is zero), and are FPT when parameterized
by the number of voters.
Our results rely on reductions from traditional problems such as MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE
and DOMINATING SET. Our hardness results work even when the input is specified in unary.
It is reasonably natural to imagine that these parameters would be small in practice, since
they correspond to real-world budget constraints. To that end, our results here bring mixed
news: on the one hand, the hardness of mounting an attack may be viewed as a positive
outcome, but on the other hand, it turns out that the problem of optimally reversing dam-
ages is hard as well. This triggers the natural question of whether the recounting problem
admits good approximations when treated as an optimization problem, either on the criteria
of the budget or on the criteria of the quality of the winning candidate that we are able to
restore. The FPT algorithms that we present rely mostly on straightforward enumeration,
and it would be interesting to improve the running times in question.
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Related Work.
While we build most closely on the work of Elkind et al [5], and much of the work on
manipulation in the literature of social choice does not consider the possibility of a counter-
attack, we note that some recent investigations have been carried out in a spirit that is
similar to our present contribution. Dey et al. [3] also consider a parameterized approach
to protecting elections, where the voting rule in question is the Condorcet rule. They build
on the work of Yin et al. [10], who study a pre-emptive approach to protecting elections.
In these models, the defender allocates resources to guard some of the electoral districts,
so that the votes there cannot be influenced, and the attacker responds afterward. This is
in contrast to our setting, where the defender makes the second move. The social choice
literature is rich in studies of manipluation, control, and bribery. For a detailed overview we
direct the reader to the surveys [1, 7].
2 Preliminaries
We recall the setting from [5]. We consider elections over a candidate set C, where |C| = m.
There are n voterswho are partitioned into k pairwise disjoint districts. The set of all districts
is D. For each i ∈ D, let ni = |i|. We note that in this context, i denotes a subset of voters.
For each i ∈ D, district i has a weight wi, which is a positive integer. We say that an election
is unweighted if wi = 1 for all i ∈ D. Each voter votes for a single candidate in C. For each
i ∈ D and each c ∈ C let vic denote the number of votes that candidate c gets from voters
in i. We refer to the list v = (vic)i∈D,c∈C as the vote profile.
Let ≻ be a linear order over C; a ≻ b indicates that a is favored over b. We consider the
following two voting rules, which take the vote profile v as their input.
Plurality over Voters (PV): We say that a candidate a beats a candidate b under PV if∑
i∈D
via >
∑
i∈D
vib or
∑
i∈D
via =
∑
i∈D
vib and a ≻ b; the winner is the candidate that beats
all other candidates. Note that district weights wi are not relevant for this rule.
Plurality over Districts (PD): For each i ∈ D the winner ci in i is chosen from the set
arg maxc∈Cvic, with ties broken according to ≻. Then, for each i ∈ D, c ∈ C, we set
wic = wi if c = ci, else wic = 0. We say that a candidate a beats a candidate b under
PD if
∑
i∈D
wia >
∑
i∈D
wib or
∑
i∈D
wia =
∑
i∈D
wib and a ≻ b. The winner is the candidate
that beats all other candidates. Given the voting profile v, we take the winner in district
i to be Gv(i). We shall omit the subscript if the voting profile to be used is clear from the
context.
For PV and PD, we define the social welfare of a candidate c ∈ C as the total number of votes
that c gets and the total weight that c gets, respectively:
SWPV(c) =
∑
i∈D
vic, SW
PD(c) =
∑
i∈D
wic
Hence, the winner under each voting rule is a candidate with the maximum social welfare.
We now define some additional terminology that we use later in this paper:
Score: Given a voting profile u, under the PD rule, the score of a candidate p is defined
as the sum of weights of districts in which the candidate p wins. Formally, scu(p) =∑
i∈D
wi · δG(i)p (Here δ is the Kronecker delta function).
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Rivals: Given a voting profile u, under the PD rule, we define the rivals of a candidate p to
be the set of candidates C ⊂ C such that for all candidates c ∈ C, either scu(c) > scu(p)
or scu(c) = scu(p) and c ≻ p.
We now consider the scenario where an election may be manipulated by an attacker, who
wants to change the result of the election in favor of his preferred candidate p. The attacker
has a budget BA ∈ N which enables him to change the voting profiles in at most BA districts.
For each district i ∈ D, we define γi, 0 6 γi 6 ni to be the number of votes that the attacker
can manipulate in i. After the manipulation we have a voting profile v = (vic)i∈D,c∈C. We
formalize the notion of a manipulation as a set M ⊆ D and a voting profile v such that
|M| 6 BA where vic = vic for all i /∈ M and for all i ∈ M it holds that
∑
c∈C
vic = ni and∑
c∈C
|vic−vic|
2
6 γi.
After the attacker, a socially minded defender with budget BD ∈ {0} ∪ N can demand a
recount in at most BD districts. Formally, a recounting strategy R is a set such that R ⊆ M
and |R| 6 BD. After the defender recounts, the vote counts of the districts in R are restored
to their original values. This results in a new voting profile u = (uic)i∈D,c∈C where for all
i ∈ D\M∪ R,uic = vic and for all i ∈M \ R,uic = vic. Then the voting rule V = {PV ,PD}
is applied to the profile u that is obtained to obtain a winner (let it be w′) with ties broken
according to ≻. The defender’s objective is to maximize SWV(w′). It is a game of perfect
information i.e. both entities know all information about the game.
We say that the attacker wins if he has a manipulation strategy such that after the defender
moves optimally, the preferred candidate of attacker i.e. p wins. We define the following
two decision problems based on voting rule V ∈ {PV ,PD} and the two entities:
V-MAN: Given the voting rule V, a voting profile v, the linear order ≻, a preferred
candidate p, attacker budget BA, defender budget BD and weights wi and parameter γi
for each district i ∈ D, does the attacker have a winning strategy?
V-REC: Given the voting rule V, a voting profile v, a manipulated voting profile v, a
preferred candidate w, the linear order ≻, defender budget BD and weights wi for each
district i ∈ D, can the defender make w win by recounting at most BD districts?
Next we state the definitions and parameterized hardness results for decision problems that
are used throughout this paper, and refer the reader to [4, 2] for a detailed introduction to
parameterized complexity and the framework of parameterized reductions.
DOMINATING SET: A set of vertices D is a dominating set in graph G if V(G) = NG[D].
DOMINATING SET asks that given a graph G and a non-negative integer k, does there
exist a dominating set of size at most k? DOMINATING SET is known to be W[2]-hard
parameterized by k [4].
MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE: Given a graph G and a partition of the vertex set V into k
color classes V1,V2, . . .Vk, MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE asks whether there exists a clique of
size k with one vertex each from V1,V2, . . .Vk. MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE is known to be
W[1]-hard parameterized by k [8, 9].
3 Plurality over Voters (PV)
In this section, we analyze the parameterized complexity of PV-REC and PV-MAN with dif-
ferent parameters. It is easy to see that PV-REC is FPT when parameterized by the number
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of districts (k), since we may guess the districts to be recounted. Since k 6 n, the problem
is also FPT parameterized by the number of voters.
◮ Proposition 3. PV-REC is FPT when parameterized by the no. of districts k or the number
of voters n.
We now show that PV-REC is W[2]-hard when parameterized by budget of the defender
(BD). Before describing the construction formally, we briefly outline the main idea. We
reduce from the DOMINATING SET, which is well-known to be W[2]-hard parameterized
by the size of the solution, which we denote by k. Let (G = (V ,E), k) be an instance of
DOMINATING SET. We create an instance of PV-REC where we have candidates and districts
corresponding to vertices of G, along with a special candidate w who is our desired winner.
To begin with, we have an “immutable” district — one where the original and manipulated
votes are identical — that sets the baseline score of the special candidate at n. The number
votes for any other candidate c from this district is fixed to ensure that the total number of
votes for c is also n. In a district corresponding to a vertex v, every candidate corresponding
to a vertex u ∈ N[v] gets one vote. In the original scenario, all voters in these districts vote
only for some dummy candidates. The key is that a “switch” in a district corresponding to a
vertex v reduces the vote count for all vertices in N[v]. Since w receives no votes from any of
the other districts, observe that the only way for w to emerge as a unique winner is if all of
the other candidates lose votes from the switches. It is not hard to infer from here that the
defender has a valid switching strategy if and only if G has a dominating set of size at most
k.
◮ Lemma 4. PV-REC is W[2]-hard parameterized by BD, the defender’s budget.
Proof. We present an FPT reduction from the DOMINATING SET problem. Let (G = (V ,E), k)
be an instance of DOMINATING SET. Let N = |V | and M = |E|. We begin by describing the
construction of the reduced instance.
Districts: We introduce a baseline district D0. Further, for each vertex v ∈ V , we introduce
a corresponding primary district Dv.
Candidates: For each vertex v ∈ V we introduce a main candidate cv and a dummy candid-
ate dv. We also have a special candidate w.
Voting Outcomes: The voting outcomes are as follows. For ease of presentation, let v ∈ V
be arbitrary but fixed.
1. The special candidate does not receive any votes from the primary districts in either the
original or the manipulated settings. In particular, vDv,w = vDv,w = 0.
2. In the original election, the main candidates have no votes in the primary districts, that
is, vDv,cu = 0 for all u ∈ V .
3. In the manipulated election, a main candidate cu has a single vote in its favor in the
primary district Dv if and only if u ∈ NG[v]. Formally,
vDv,cu =
{
1 if u ∈ NG[v]
0 otherwise
4. In the original election, a dummy candidate du has a score of d(u) + 1 in the primary
district corresponding to u, and a score of zero everywhere else. Formally,
vDv,du =
{
d(v) + 1 if u = v
0 otherwise
6 A Parameterized Perspective on Attacking and Defending Elections
5. The dummy candidates receive no votes in the primary districts in the manipulated elec-
tions.
6. In the baseline district, the score of the main candidates is defined to ensure that their
total score in the manipulated election is N. In particular, vD0,cv = vD0,cv = N−(d(v)+
1).
7. The dummy candidates receive no votes in the baseline district in both the original and
manipulated elections.
8. The score ofw isN in the baseline district in both the original and manipulated elections.
In particular, vD0,w = vD0,w = N.
To summarize, the primary districts corresponding to a vertex v have d(v) + 1 voters, and
all main candidates corresponding to vertices in NG[v] get one vote each in the manipulated
world; while the dummy candidate dv gets all the votes in the original world. Observe that
in the manipulated election, all the candidates except the dummy candidates have a total
score of N, while the dummy candidates have a score of zero.
We set BD= k. The preferred candidate is w. We also work with the following tie-breaking
order: . . . cv . . . ≻ w ≻ . . .dvu . . . , where the main candidates are preferred over the special
candidate, but the special candidate dominates the dummy candidates. This completes the
description of the constructed instance. We now turn to the proof of equivalence.
Forward Direction. Let a dominating set S of size at most k be given. Now, select the
districts Dv for all v ∈ S to recount. After recounting, for every vertex v in the dominating
set, the votes of cu for all u ∈ NG[v] will decrease by one. Since
⋃
v∈S
N[v] = V , all candidates
corresponding to vertices will lose at least one vote each. Also, no dummy candidate can
gain more than N votes after recounting. So, w has more votes than any main candidate
and at least as many votes as any of the dummy candidates. Therefore, w will win after
recounting.
Reverse Direction. Conversely, suppose that the defender has a valid recounting strategy Z
that results in making w the winner. Since |Z| 6 BD, so at most k districts can be recounted.
Observe that any optimal solution will not recount the baseline district, since it does not
affect the outcome, so without loss of generality, every recounted district corresponds to a
vertex v ∈ V . We claim that the vertices corresponding to the recounted districts, which we
denote by S, constitute a dominating set in G.
We argue this by contradiction — indeed, assume that S is not a dominating set for G. Then
there exists at least one vertex u ∈ V such that S∩N[u] = ∅. Then, observe that the score of
the candidate cu remains N after the recounting. In particular, cu has the same score as the
special candidate w after recounting, since the construction ensures that it is not possible
to change the score of w by recounting. Since the main candidates dominate the special
candidate in the tie-breaking order, we have that cu wins the election, which contradicts
our assumption that Z was a valid recounting strategy. ◭
We now turn our attention to PV-MAN. First, we prove that PV-MAN is FPT parameterized by
the number of voters. This follows by first observing thatm 6 2n without loss of generality,
since at most 2n candidates can have a non-trivial score across the original and manipu-
lated instances combined, and the remaining candidates are irrelevant to the instance. The
algorithm can then proceed by guessing a manipulation strategy — note that the space of
all possible strategies is bounded once the candidates are bounded — and then invoking
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the PD-REC algorithm from the previous section as a subroutine to verify the validity of the
guessed strategy. Thus, we have the following.
◮ Proposition 5. PV-MAN is FPT parameterized by n, the number of voters.
We now show that PV-MAN is W[1]-hard parameterized by budget of the attacker (BA). Be-
fore describing the construction formally, we briefly outline the main idea. We reduce from
the MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE problem, which is well-known to be W[1]-hard parameterized
by the number of color classes, which we denote by k. Let (G = (V = V1 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Vk,E), k)
be an instance of MULTICOLORED-CLIQUE. In the reduced instance, we introduce a special
candidate w who is the preferred candidate of the defender. The rival candidates are candid-
ates corresponding to color classes Ri, ordered pairs of color classes Rij and vertices cv. We
also introduce some dummy candidates. We introduce districts corresponding to each v ∈ V
and each e ∈ E. Also, there exists a special district which is “immutable”, which sets up the
initial scores of all candidates such that they are equal to a large number (say F). Initially,
w has 0 votes. The scores are set up in such a way that the attacker has to transfer votes of
k2 districts to w to make her win. The scores are engineered to ensure that the attacker has
a successful manipulation strategy if and only if these k2 districts correspond to k vertices
and
(
k
2
)
edges that form a multicolored clique in G.
◮ Lemma 6. PV-MAN is W[1]-hard parameterized by BA, the attacker’s budget.
Proof. We demonstrate a parameterized reduction from the MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE prob-
lem. Let (G = (V = V1⊎· · ·⊎Vk,E), k) be an instance of MULTI-COLORED CLIQUE. We begin
by describing the construction.
Districts: There are two types of districts. We have a primary district Dv for each vertex
v ∈ V and two secondary districts Duv and Dvu for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E. Apart from
these, there is a baseline district D0.
Candidates: For each vertex v ∈ V we will have a main candidate cv. Also, we have chal-
lenger candidates corresponding to color classes Ri’s and ordered pairs of color classes Rij’s.
We introduce some dummy candidates of an unspecified number, whose role is equalize the
number of votes across primary and secondary districts. Finally, we have a special candidate
w.
Voting profiles: We introduce the following voting outcomes for the candidates.
1. The score of the special candidate w is zero in all districts.
2. A main candidate cv for v ∈ V has a score of k − 1 in the primary district corresponding
to v, and a score of zero in all other primary districts.
3. A main candidate cv for v ∈ V has a score of one in every secondary district correspond-
ing to an edge e = {u,w} that it is not incident to, provided u and v share the same color
class. In particular, if v ∈ Vi and there are t edges incident on Vi \ {v}, then cv has a
score of one in t secondary districts. Formally, assuming v ∈ Vi, we have:
vDuw,cv =
{
1 if u 6= v and u ∈ Vi
0 otherwise
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4. A challenger candidate corresponding to color class i has one vote from any primary
district corresponding to a vertex v ∈ Vi and a score of zero from all other primary
districts. In other words:
vDv,Ri =
{
1 if v ∈ Vi
0 otherwise
5. A challenger candidate corresponding to an ordered pair of color classes (Vi,Vj) has one
vote from any secondary district Duv corresponding to an edge e ∈ E whose endpoints
u and v are in color classes Vi and Vj respectively, and a score of zero from all other
secondary districts. Note that the candidates Rij and Rji receive scores of one from
distinct secondary districts. Specifically, we have: vDuv,Rij = 1 if u ∈ Vi and v ∈ Vj.
Now, let ℓ be the size of the largest — in terms of the number of voters — among the primary
and secondary districts constructed so far. For every primary or secondary district D with
ν(D) voters, we add ℓ−ν(D) dummy voters and dummy candidates, and we let each dummy
voter vote for a distinct dummy candidate. We let F = ℓk2.
We are now ready to specify the voting outcomes from the baseline district. these are simply
designed to ensure that all primary candidates cv get F + k − 2 votes and the challenger
candidates get F votes, which is easy to verify from the proposed outcomes below:
1. vD0,cv = F− 1 −
∑
e={u,v}∈E
(vDuv,cv + vDvu,cv)
2. vD0,Ri = F−
∑
u∈V
vDu,Ri −
∑
e={u,v}∈E
(vDuv,Ri + vDvu,Ri)
3. vD0,Rij = F−
∑
u∈V
vDu,Rij −
∑
e={u,v}∈E
(vDuv,Rij + vDvu,Rij)
Note that apart from the above, the dummy candidates get 1 vote each, and the special
candidate w has 0 votes. Also, the attacker has no room to manipulate in the baseline
district, that is, γD0 = 0. On the other hand, the attacker can modify up to ℓ votes in
the primary and secondary districts. Further, we set BA = k
2 and BD = 0. The preferred
candidate is w. Finally, we impose the following tie-breaking order:
. . .Ri . . . ≻ . . .Rij . . . ≻ . . . cv . . . ≻ w ≻ . . . dummies . . . .
This completes the description of the constructed instance. We now turn to the proof of
equivalence.
Forward Direction. Let a multi-colored clique S of size k be given. The attacker chooses
the k primary and 2
(
k
2
)
secondary districts corresponding to the vertices and edges of S, and
transfers all the ℓ votes in these k2 districts to the desired candidate w. The score of w is
now F. Further, note that that the scores of all challenger candidates has decreased by one
to F − 1, and the scores of all main candidates have decreased by k − 1 as well, but for
different reasons: for main candidates corresponding to vertices of the clique, the drop is
directly from the recounting in the primary districts, while for any other main candidate,
the drop is cumulative across (k − 1) relevant secondary districts. In particular, suppose
S∩Vi := {vi}. Consider any u ∈ Vi such that u 6= vi, and observe that cu had a score of one
in the following (k − 1) districts:
Dviv1 , . . . ,Dvivi−1 ,Dvivi+1 , . . . ,Dvivk ,
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which have indeed been attacked, and therefore the score of cu reduces by k−1. This leaves
all candidates ranked ahead of the special candidate w in the tie-breaking order with a score
less than the final score of w, and the scores of the dummy candidates is either zero or one,
thus they pose no threat to w. Therefore, w wins the election under this attack, concluding
the argument in the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Suppose that the attacker has a valid manipulation strategy Z that
results in making w the winner. With a budget of k2 and manipulable districts with ℓ voters,
recalling that F = ℓk2, we observe that the maximum score that an attacker an achieve for
the special candidate w is F. Since challenger candidates have a score of F and are ahead
of w in the tie-breaking order, we conclude that for each i ∈ [k], Z must contain at least
one primary district corresponding to a vertex from Vi — indeed, if not, the attack does not
influence the score of challenger candidates corresponding to some color class, and attack
will not result in a win for w. We claim that these vertices correspond to a clique in G. We
argue this claim by contradiction. To begin with, we note that analogous to the vertex-based
challenger candidates, the attack is forced to have a certain structure to account for the edge-
based challeger candidates. In particular, for each ordered pair of color classes (Vi,Vj), the
attack must recount in a secondary district Dpq such that p ∈ Vi and q ∈ Vj. Note that
the existence of such a district implies that (p,q) ∈ E. Also, recalling the argument made
earlier for the existence of primary districts corresponding to each color class in the attack,
and combining this with the available budget of k2, it is easy to see that any successful
attack has the following specific form: it involves exactly k primary districts corresponding
to k vertices from k different color classes, and k(k − 1) secondary districts corresponding
to each ordered pair of color classes.
Now, let the vertices derived from the attack be {v1, . . . , vk} where vi ∈ Vi, and suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that (vi, vj) /∈ E(G). The challenger candidates Rij and Rji
force the attacker to recount in two secondary districts corresponding to edges that have
endpoints in Vi and Vj. Suppose the secondary district recounted to account for Rij was
Dxy, with x ∈ Vi and y ∈ Vj. Suppose, without loss of generality, that x 6= vi. We know
from the original score of x and the maximum possible final score of w that a successful
attack needs to ensure that the score of x reduces by at least k − 1. However, note that this
decrease cannot be addressed by a primary district in the attack Z, since this is already “used
up” for vi 6= x. Also, among the remaining secondary districts chosen, it is easy to verify that
there are at most (k − 2) that give a score of one to the candidate x, and therefore, we can
only hope to reduce the score of x by at most k−2 overall. Note that we are in this situation
because x has a score of zero in the districtDxy, which might be intuitively viewed as a “lost
opportunity” for reducing the score of x. This establishes that the attack in question is futile
in it’s effectiveness towards making w win, clearly contrary to our assumption. Therefore,
Z must choose primary districts which correspond to a multi-colored clique in G, and this
completes the argument in the reverse direction. ◭
4 Plurality over Districts (PD)
In this section, we analyze the parameterized complexity of PD-REC and PD-MAN. As with
PV-REC, it is easy to see that PD-REC is also FPT when parameterized by the number of
districts (k), since we may guess the districts to be recounted. Since n > k, it is also FPT
parameterized by the number of voters.
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◮ Proposition 7. PD-REC is FPT when parameterized by the number of districts k or the
number of voters n.
We now show that PD-REC is W[1]-hard parameterized by budget of the defender BD. Be-
fore describing the construction formally, we briefly outline the main idea. We reduce from
the MULTICOLORED-CLIQUE PROBLEM, which is well-known to be W[1]-hard parameterized
by the no. of color classes, which we denote by k. Let (G = (V = V1 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Vk,E), k)
be an instance of MULTICOLORED-CLIQUE. In the reduced instance, we introduce a special
candidate w who is the preferred candidate of the defender. The rival candidates are can-
didates corresponding to color classes Ri and ordered pairs of color classes Rij. Further, we
introduce candidates encoding the vertices cv and edges he & ae. We also introduce some
dummy candidates. We introduce two districts corresponding to each v ∈ V and five districts
corresponding to each e ∈ E. Also, there exists a baseline district for each candidate which
is “immutable”, which sets up the initial scores of all candidates such that they are equal to
a large number (say λ). The scores are set up in such a way that there is no way to increase
the score of w, thus we require to reduce the score of all the rivals by at least one while not
increasing the scores of other candidates. But the districts and voting profiles are engineered
so as to enforce that any recounting solution must have a certain structure, from which we
can draw a correspondence to a subset of vertices which must in fact form a multi-colored
clique of size k in G.
◮ Lemma 8. PD-REC is W[1]-hard parameterized by BD, the defender’s budget.
Proof. This hardness result follows from the following reduction from the MULTI-COLORED
CLIQUE problem. The given instance is the graph G = (V ,E) and the number of unique color
classes, k, where Vi denotes the i
th color class. We begin by describing the construction of
the reduced instance.
Candidates: For every color class 1 6 i 6 k there is a candidate Ri corresponding to Vi.
Further, for every pair of color classes (i, j) such that 1 6 i < j 6 k, we introduce two
candidates Rij and Rji. These will be the rival candidates of the reduced instance. Now
we introduce candidates that encode the vertices and edges of the graph G. To begin with,
for each vertex v ∈ V we introduce two candidates cv and dv, which we will refer to as the
main and dummy candidates, respectively. Also, for every edge e ∈ E, we introduce two
candidates he and ae, which we refer to as the helper and auxiliary candidates, respectively.
Finally, we have a special candidate w. To summarize, the overall set of candidates is:
C = {Ri | i ∈ [k]} ∪
{
Rij,Rji | (i, j) ∈
(
[k]
2
)}
∪ {cv,dv | v ∈ V} ∪ {ae,he | e ∈ E}
Districts: We introduce the following districts.
1. For each v ∈ V we introduce a primary district Dv with weight one and a critical district
D⋆v with weight k.
2. For each e = (u, v) ∈ E, we introduce two edge districtsDuv andDvu, one support district
Se, and two transfer districts Te,u and Te,v. The support districts have weight two, while
the remaining districts have weight one.
3. For each candidate c ∈ C \ {dv | v ∈ V}, we introduce a baseline district Bc with a weight
of λc, which will be specified in due course.
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Voting outcomes: The voting outcomes in the original and manipulated districts are depic-
ted in the table below.
District Type Dv D
⋆
v Duv Dvu Se Te,u Te,v Bc
Original Winner cv dv he he ae cu cv c
Manipulated Winner Rj cv Rij Rji he ae ae c
Weight 1 k 1 1 2 1 1 λc
Table 1 For the winners depicted above assume that v ∈ Vj and that e = (u, v), and further that
u ∈ Vi and v ∈ Vj. The subscript c in the last column corresponding to the baseline districts denotes
an arbitrary non-dummy candidate.
Note that the voting outcome in the baseline districts is the same in the original and manip-
ulated settings. It only remains to specify explicitly the weights of the baseline districts. We
let λw := (n+ 1)k+ 6m. Recall that this is the weight of the baseline district corresponding
to the special candidate. For any non-dummy candidate c, let s(c) be its score from the
manipulated districts. We then set λc := λw − s(c). With these weights, we ensure that all
the non-dummy candidates tie for the same score (i.e, λw) in the manipulated election, and
all dummy candidates have a score of zero. We note that all the weights introduced here are
polynomially bounded. We set BD = 2k+ 5×
(
k
2
)
. The preferred candidate is w.
We enforce the following tie-breaking order: . . .Ri . . . ≻ . . .Rij . . . ≻ w ≻ . . . cv . . . ≻
. . .ae . . . ≻ . . .he . . . ≻ . . .dv . . . .
This completes the description of the constructed instance. We now turn to the proof of
equivalence.
Forward Direction. Let a multi-colored clique V⋆ = {v1, . . . , vk} of size k be given, and
without loss of generality, we assume that vi ∈ Vi. Now, recount in districts Dv and D
⋆
v for
all v ∈ V⋆. Also, for every edge e = (u, v) in G[V⋆], we recount in the districts Duv, Dvu, Se,
Te,u and Te,v.
We claim that this recounting strategy leads to a win for w. To begin with, observe that the
score of every rival candidate drops by one. Indeed, for all i ∈ [k], the score of Ri reduces
by one having lost the primary district Dvi . Further, for all (i, j) ∈
(
[k]
2
)
, the scores of Rij
and Rji reduce by one each, having lost in the edge districts Dvivj and Dvjvi , respectively.
It is easy to see that the score of w and any candidate corresponding to vertices and edges
not involved in the clique remain unchanged.
Now, consider the auxiliary and helper candidates ae,he corresponding to an edge e in
G[V⋆]. The score of the helper candidate increases by two in the edge districts used to beat
the rival candidates, but also decreases by two because of the recounting in the support
district corresponding to e. This causes the score of the auxiliary candidate to increase by
two, but the recounting the two transfer districts again decreases its score by two. Therefore,
in terms of total score, the auxiliary and helper candidates are back to where they started.
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Meanwhile, the recounting across all transfer districts causes the scores of all the main can-
didates corresponding to vertices of the clique to increase by (k − 1), and their score also
increases by one in the recounted primary districts used to decrease the score of the rival
candidates corresponding to vertices. However, recounting in the critical districts reduces
their score by k, and we conclude that the net change of score is zero for the main candidates
as well. The recounting across the critical districts causes the scores of some dummy candid-
ates to increase by k < λw. The scores of all other dummy candidates remains unchanged at
zero. Based on the tie-breaking order, it is easy to verify that w wins under this score profile
(all rival candidates ranked ahead score less than w and all other candidates that are tied
with w are ranked below w in the tie-breaking order). This concludes the argument in the
forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Conversely, suppose that the defender has a recounting strategy Z that
results in making w the winner. Since the rival candidates dominate w in the tie-breaking
order and have the same score as w among the manipulated districts, it is imperative for
the defender to force every rival candidate to lose at least one of the districts that it wins in
the manipulated setting. In particular, Z must include at least k primary districts and 2
(
k
2
)
edge districts. Let us say that a solution Z is well-formed if it consists of k primary districts, k
critical districts, and 2
(
k
2
)
edge districts,
(
k
2
)
support districts and 2
(
k
2
)
transfer districts, and
further, that for any e = (u, v) ∈ E:
Duv ∈ Z ⇐⇒ Dvu ∈ Z ⇐⇒ Se ∈ Z ⇐⇒ Te,u ∈ Z and Te,v ∈ Z.
A well-formed solution naturally corresponds to a subset of
(
k
2
)
edges, which we will now
refer to as the affected edges. Note that any vertex incident to an affected edge emerges as a
threat to w because of the recounting in the transfer districts Te,u and Te,v, which are won
by cu and cv respectively in the original election. Now, observe that the only way to “fix”
this is to recount in a critical district corresponding to the vertex in question. Therefore, if
the affected edges span ℓ vertices, we are forced to recount at least ℓ critical districts. Recall
that the rival candidates corresponding to color classes impose a requirement of recounting
k primary districts. Thus, given our overall budget of 2k + 5 ·
(
k
2
)
, we conclude that the
(
k
2
)
affected edges derived from any well-formed solution must in fact span exactly k vertices,
and it is straightforward to verify that these vertices will correspond to a multi-colored clique
in G.
From the discussion above, it suffices to show that any valid solution Z must, in fact, be a
well-formed solution. To begin with, note that the rival candidates corresponding to pairs
of color classes force a recount in 2
(
k
2
)
of the edge districts. We first argue that these must
correspond to
(
k
2
)
distinct edges, in other words, Duv ∈ Z ⇐⇒ Dvu ∈ Z. Indeed, suppose
not. Consider the set F ⊆ E of all edges corresponding to the recounted edge districts in Z,
and note that our assumption implies that |F| >
(
k
2
)
.
Now observe that the recounting in the edge districts turns the corresponding helper edge
candidates into rivals. The only way to reverse this damage is to recount in the support
districts corresponding to these edges, which are the only districts that are won by the
helper candidates in the manipulated election. However, these recounts in turn cause the
“partner” auxiliary candidates to emerge as new rivals whose scores are two more than the
score of w — recall that the support districts had a weight of two. Again, based on the
voting outcomes, we see that we are now forced to recount in both the transfer districts
corresponding to the auxiliary candidates, since these are again the only districts that are
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won by the auxiliary candidates in question. As a result of the recounting in the transfer
districts, the score of every vertex incident to any edge in F has strictly increased. Note,
however, that since |F| >
(
k
2
)
, F necessarily spans more than k vertices in G, each of which
are now a threat to w. This forces a recount of as many critical districts for w to win, but
this contradicts the available budget. Therefore, we conclude that Duv ∈ Z ⇐⇒ Dvu ∈ Z.
It is easy to see that the recounting of the corresponding support and transfer districts are
forced based on the voting outcomes and the arguments made earlier in this discussion.
Thus we conclude that any valid solution is well-formed, which in turn leads to a natural
selection of vertices corresponding to a clique in G, completing the argument in the reverse
direction. ◭
We now turn our attention to PD-MAN. We observe that PD-MAN can also be shown to be
W[1]-hard by a reduction from PD-REC. We briefly sketch the main idea: to begin with, we
switch the roles of the manipulated profiles and the original ones, set the defender budget
to zero and the attacker budget to the defender budget. We would also set up the votes in
the districts to be such that the only meaningful manipulation by the attacker is to move
the manipulated profile to the original one. The equivalence is based on repurposing a
recounting strategy to an attacking one and vice-versa.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our main contribution was to settle the parameterized complexity for the problems of re-
counting and manipulation when parameterized by the player budgets, for both the PD and
PV implementations of the plurality voting rules. We also observed that these problems are
FPT when parameterized by the number of voters, and that the recounting problem is FPT
when parameterized by the number of districts as well.
We make some remarks about directions for future work. In the setting of succinct input,
the problems of recounting and manipulation are already para-NP-hard because of the NP-
completeness for three candidates. When the votes are specified in unary is an interesting
direction for future work. The dynamic programming algorithm proposed by [5] already
shows that the problem is in XP, parameterized by the number of candidates, and we leave
open the issue of whether the problem is FPT. The problem of manipulation parameterized
by the number of districts is another unresolved case. More broadly, it would be interesting
to challenge the theoretical hardness results obtained here against heuristics employed on
real world data sets. The issue of identifying and working with structural parameters is also
an interesting direction for further thought.
References
[1] Vincent Conitzer and Toby Walsh. ‘Barriers to Manipulation in Voting’. In: Handbook
of Computational Social Choice. Ed. by Felix Brandt 0001 et al. Cambridge University
Press, 2016, pp. 127–145. ISBN: 9781107446984.
[2] Marek Cygan et al. Parameterized Algorithms. 1st. Springer Publishing Company, In-
corporated, 2015. ISBN: 978-3-319-21275-3.
[3] Palash Dey et al. ‘A Parameterized Perspective on Protecting Elections’. In: Proceedings
of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-19.
2019, pp. 238–244.
14 A Parameterized Perspective on Attacking and Defending Elections
[4] R. G. Downey and M. R. Fellows. Parameterized Complexity. Springer, 1999.
[5] Edith Elkind et al. ‘Protecting Elections by Recounting Ballots’. In: IJCAI. 2019, pp. 259–
265.
[6] Edith Elkind et al. Protecting Elections by Recounting Ballots. 2019. arXiv: 1906.07071
[cs.GT].
[7] Piotr Faliszewski and Jörg Rothe. ‘Control and Bribery in Voting’. In: Handbook of
Computational Social Choice. Ed. by Felix Brandt 0001 et al. Cambridge University
Press, 2016, pp. 146–168. ISBN: 9781107446984.
[8] Michael R. Fellows et al. ‘On the parameterized complexity of multiple-interval graph
problems’. In: Theor. Comput. Sci 410.1 (2009), pp. 53–61.
[9] Krzysztof Pietrzak. ‘On the parameterized complexity of the fixed alphabet shortest
common supersequence and longest common subsequence problems’. In: J. Comput.
Syst. Sci 67.4 (2003), pp. 757–771.
[10] Yue Yin et al. ‘Optimally Protecting Elections’. In: IJCAI. IJCAI/AAAI Press, 2016,
pp. 538–545.
